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Incorporating the Human Facet of Security in Developing Systems and 
Services
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present an integrative framework for handling the security and 
usability conflicts during the system development lifecycle. The framework has been formulated while 
considering key concerns raised after conducting a series of interviews with practitioners from the industry. 
The framework is aimed at assisting system designers and developers in making reasonably accurate 
choices when it comes to the trade-offs between security and usability. The outcomes of employing the 
framework are documented as design patterns, which are disseminated among the community of system 
designers and developers for use in other but similar contexts.
Design/methodology/approach – A Design Science Research (DSR) approach was used to develop the 
integrative framework for usable security. Interviews were conducted for identification of the key concerns; 
however, the framework was validated during a workshop. Moreover, to validate the patterns’ template and 
the usable security pattern identified after instantiating the framework, a survey instrument was used.
Findings – (1) It is important to consider the usability aspect in the development of security systems, 
otherwise, the systems despite being secure against attacks would be susceptible to user mistakes leading 
to compromises. (2) It is worthwhile to handle usable security concerns right from the start of system 
development lifecycle. (3) Design patterns can help the developers in assessing the usability of their security 
options.  
Practical Implications – The framework would assist the designers and developers in handling the security 
and usability conflicts right from the start of the syste  development lifecycle. The patterns documented 
after employing the framework would help not only the designers and developers working in the industry, 
but also freelancers.
Originality/value – The authors present a novel framework to handle the security and usability conflicts 
during the system development lifecycle. The development process of the framework was driven by the 
concerns raised after a series of interviews with the practitioners from industry. The framework presented 
in this paper was validated during a workshop in which it was exposed for review and comments by the 
participants from the industry. To demonstrate the use of patterns in general and the framework in particular, 
a case study featuring smart grids from the domain of cyber-physical systems is presented, which (to the 
best knowledge of the authors) features the first work relevant to usable security in the domain of cyber-
physical systems.
Keywords Usable security, patterns, usability, security, framework, cyber-physical systems, design science 
research.
Paper type Research paper


































































The increased reliance on technical infrastructures like cloud and cyber-physical systems (CPS), and the 
ever-growing scope of services they support has made their monitoring and security considerably harder 
tasks. Organizations deploying these systems for managing day-to-day operations are spending billions of 
dollars on security technologies to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of their data, and availability of 
their services (RSAC, 2019).  However, the increasing complexity of the threat model where these systems 
are deployed has been so demanding in terms of providing robustness of features and complying with 
technology needs that it has left less time and budget to consider other vital aspects like the usability of 
security and enforcing policy-compliant behavior (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2014).  In the case of services like 
smart grids, human errors leading to security breaches can have a more severe impact because of the safety-
critical nature of the services. 
Traditionally, security and usability have evolved independently and the recommendations from security 
and usability perspectives are often in conflict. Typical examples of the conflicts include, strong password 
guidelines, which is good from a security perspective but from usability perspective such a password adds 
cognitive burden on the user (to memorize the password and type it correctly), and, password masking, 
which is alright from a security perspective to protect against ‘shoulder surfing’ and other attacks, but at 
the cost of usability element of ‘feedback’  Furthermore, having evolved independently, expertise in both 
security and usability is hard to find in one person. 
A case study finding reveals ‘developer knows best’ approach, which means that incorporating the 
human aspects in security design and development is reliant on the skills of developers who are either 
experts in security, or in usability (Caputo et al., 2016). Consequently, the emphasis of security developers 
has always been to make the system secure and un-exploitable, which as a byproduct may leave the system 
less usable (Naqvi and Seffah, 2018). 
Despite the challenges posed by security as a quality, it is important to note that it is the human user in 
different roles, who interacts with the security functionality to protect the system; therefore, it is imperative 
to consider the human aspects while designing the security systems and services. With incorporating the 
human aspects, it is expected to consider in security design the elements of usability (as identified and 
defined by ISO 25010 standards) such as effectiveness, efficiency, effective in use, and the elements of user 
experience (UX), which include memorability, findability, satisfaction, credibility, (Morville, 2004). The 
domain considering human aspects related to security and the integration of usability in the security design 
is commonly referred to as usable security. Moreover, the state of the art concerning the integration of 
human aspects in security design identifies gaps (Naqvi and Seffah, 2019), including, failure of security 
specialists to address usability as perceived and defined by the human computer interaction (HCI) 
community, and industry’s behavior being more driven by bug fixing rather than trying to examine and 
consider the context in which the bugs occurs. 
Caputo et al., (2016) state that “usable security assumes that when security functions are more usable, 
people are more likely to use them, leading to an improvement in overall security. Existing software design 
and engineering processes provide little guidance for leveraging this in the development of applications”. 
Security developers are often not trained in handling usability concerns and vice versa yet management of 
the conflicts is reliant on skill of the developers. This identifies the need for assisting the developers in 
management of the conflicts. To do so, the following issues need to be explored.
1. How can the conflicts and suitable trade-offs (addressing those conflicts) be identified and 
documented during the system development lifecycle?

































































2. Can design patterns be used to disseminate the suitable trade-offs thereby assisting the system 
designers and developers in managing the conflicts?
While considering these issues, this paper presents an integrative framework for usable security (IFUS), 
integrative in a way that the framework is based on combining the principles of security and elements of 
usability in the development of systems and services. The IFUS has been co-created with the industry while 
considering the concerns raised after a series of interviews with security and usability practitioners, and 
limitations in the methodology Naqvi and Seffah, (2018). Moreover, the IFUS was validated by conducting 
workshop involving the practitioners who had participated in the interviews. During the workshop IFUS 
was exposed for review and comments by the experts, and it was adopted. The IFUS governs management 
of the security and usability conflicts within the scope of system development lifecycle (SDLC) and allows 
security and usability concerns to be incorporated collectively right from the start of the SDLC. In IFUS, 
besides identification the management of conflicts include elicitation of suitable trade-offs, which are 
documented as patterns to support re-use and assist the community of designers and developers in handling 
the conflicts in a particular context of use. Patterns in our perception are artifacts documented in natural 
language and addressing a repetitive problem (Naqvi and Seffah, 2019). Patterns are practical and describe 
instances of “good” design principles.  Patterns solving a particular usable security problem can be 
disseminated among the community of developers and designers to assist them in making decisions 
regarding the usability of security, thus delivering a balanced solution addressing the conflict and 
maximizing both factors. To standardize the documentation of usable security patterns, a template to 
document the patterns is also presented. Furthermore, in the line with the design science research method a 
case study was conducted to instantiate (demonstrate) the IFUS and identify a design pattern. The pattern 
was later validated by involving a group of developers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and related work. 
Section 3 presents the Integrative Framework for Usable Security (IFUS). Section 4 presents a case study 
to instantiate the IFUS. Section 5 presents the results of survey conducted to validate the patterns’ template 
and the pattern identified after instantiating IFUS. Section 6 presents the discussion, and Section 7 
concludes the paper.
2. Background and Related Work 
2.1 Background
Before presenting the framework, it is worthwhile to discuss two questions.
1. Why we should consider handling usable security concerns in the SDLC
2. Where in the SDLC should we consider handling usable security concerns
Each of these questions is discussed in subsequent sub-sections.
2.1.1 Why we should consider handling usable security concerns? 
Among the root causes of data breaches, the report published by IBM regarding the “Cost of Data Breach 
2018” identifies that 27% of data breaches are caused due to human factors (IBM, 2018). The human 
element is one of the most critical, yet unaddressed element in computer security research (NISTIR 8080, 
2016). The report NISTIR-8080 (2016) identifies that “the human element is a critical yet often overlooked 
component during technology integration [...], it is critical to understand users’ primary goals, the 
characteristics of the users (both physical and cognitive characteristics), and the context in which they are 
operating”.  

































































Whitten and Tygar as early as in 1998 identified the need for developers (of security functionality) to 
think from the user’s perspective. The authors stated that designers of security systems should not assume 
that the users would read manuals for configuration; instead, the security should be easy to use (Whitten 
and Tygar, 1998), however, despite this recognition more than 20 years ago, the integration of usability 
aspects in security design still pose a challenge. 
It is relevant to consider the usability aspects in the security design as a key factor of security hygiene 
(Kirlappos and Sasse, 2014). Otherwise, the developed security systems despite being secure against 
external threats could be susceptible to:
‒ User mistakes ultimately leading to system compromise.
‒ Increased user disengagement and frustration.
‒ Users working around anything necessary to do their job (Glass et al., 2016) e.g. in case of complex 
authentication systems users would employ unwanted techniques like pretexting, reusing 
credentials, wherever possible. 
It is relevant to note that i itially human aspects or usability of security was considered as limited to 
usability of the security interfaces, however, with time it was realized that it is intended to incorporate in 
security the elements of usability (as identified and defined standards such as ISO 25010) and the elements 
of user experience (UX) (Morville, 2004). Zagouras et al., (2017) presented concepts and definitions 
regarding incorporating the user experience into usable security. The authors assert that user 
experience needs to be considered in security design, as this dimension has an impact on the way the 
user interacts with the system and influences the way it behaves. As a step further, the work from S. 
Mahlke (2007) presents a framework for integration of non-instrumental   qualities, symbolic aspects 
and emotional user reactions to traditional approaches of interaction. This work could be helpful in 
incorporating the elements of user experience to usable security. In addition, the author 
demonstrated with the help of three case studies the importance of system properties, user 
characteristics and context parameters on user experience.
To cope with this challenge, the researchers studying usable security started investigating several 
avenues including, usability issues arising with user authentication, usability issues arising with email 
security and public key infrastructure (PKI), anti-phishing efforts, web-privacy and fair information 
practice; however, there are other as well (Garfinkel and Lipford, 2014). With a broader scope of security 
services ranging from authentication to email security and web-based services such as behavioral 
advertising, there is need of a generalized solution within the scope of system development lifecycle to 
address the usable security challenges arising in various contexts.  
Moreover, usable security challenges are generally in the form of conflicts. It is worthwhile to note that 
there are conflicts in each of the areas identified earlier, for example:
1. Study of text passwords features a conflict between authentication (a security mechanism) and 
memorability (a usability element) (Naqvi and Seffah 2018).
2. Various graphical password schemes in which authenticating the user takes longer than the text 
passwords feature a conflict between authentication (a security mechanism) and efficiency (a 
usability element) (Garfinkel and Lipford, 2014).
3. Email security and PKI based systems feature conflict between confidentiality (a security 
mechanism) and understandability (a usability element) (Garfinkel and Lipford, 2014). 
However, more conflicts arise in industry during the development of state-of-the-art systems and 
services, therefore, it is vital that the solution to cater the usable security challenge includes:

































































1. A mechanism for identification and documentation of conflicts as they arise.
2. A mechanism for identification and elicitation of suitable trade-offs.
3. Encapsulating the information about the conflict, context in which it occurred, and suitable 
trade-offs; and disseminating this information among the community of developers and 
designers to assist them in managing the conflicts.
2.1.2 Where in SDLC should we consider handling usable security concerns?
Yee (2004) suggested that security and usability issues should be handled together and early during the 
design process. Praveen et al., (2014), while proposing a model for incorporating security and usability 
during the requirements phase state that, “security and usability must go together hence both should begin 
at requirement level”. Similarly, Flechais et al., (2007), also suggest incorporating usable security concerns 
from the requirements phase of SDLC. Therefore, for newly developed systems security and usability 
concerns should be considered early in the system development lifecycle specifically during the 
requirements and design phase. However, for a system already in the production environment, it is vital to 
fix all reported usable security problems in the upcoming releases of the system. 
From economic perspective, it is worthwhile to handle usable security concerns right from the start of 
the SDLC to avoid conflict situations thereby circumventing costs and efforts associated with re-work 
induced due to change in system design at later stages in the development lifecycle.
Having discussed why and where to handle usable security concerns, it is worthwhile to discuss briefly 
‘how’ to do that. Firstly, it is important to identify different approaches to handle usable security concerns, 
should it be handled as a requirement, as a goal, or, as a constraint. The proposal presented in this paper 
advocates handling usable security concerns as a requirement. The need for usable security could be 
enforced by the developing organization or by the customer and the product owner, which should be 
reflected in the elicited requirements provided to the designers and developers. However, considering 
usable security as a constraint might lead to several inconsistencies in overall process of integrating security 
and usability and managing their conflicts, since security itself is considered a constraint to systems 
functional requirements (Haley et al., 2006). If security is considered as a constraint, then could usability 
of security be considered as a constraint to a constraint? Therefore, as stated earlier this research advocates 
handling usable security as a requirement, more details on how to handle usable security concerns are 
presented in the Section 3.
2.2 Related Work
Much of research work on the topic identifies a tactical approach for addressing the usable security problem 
(Garfinkel and Lipford, 2014). Tactical in a sense that the solutions are focused at addressing specific 
problems, therefore, they have a limited impact. What is required are the g neric solutions that are 
addressing the core of the problem. 
Al-Darwish et al., (2019) presented a framework for integrating security with h man factors. The 
framework provides means for classifying and viewing holistically the challenges with respect to human 
aspects in the security systems. The framework provides a mechanism to evaluate behavior of the personnel 
and adequateness of the existing security measures. The framework does not contribute towards the 
development of simultaneously secure and usable systems, rather it is limited to evaluating the 
appropriateness of security measures with respect to direct and in direct human factors.
Naqvi and Seffah (2019) present a framework for aligning security and usability during the development 
of security systems and services. The framework governs aspects from identification of the conflicts to their 

































































resolution in form of suitable trade-offs and documentation as patterns. However, the aim in that paper was 
to introduce the concept of handling security and usability conflicts during the development lifecycle of 
security systems, and potential use of design patterns for elicitation of suitable trade-offs. However, the 
framework does not provide details such as mechanism for identification of the conflicts, elicitation of 
suitable trade-offs, dissemination mechanism for usable security patterns; all of which have been considered 
in the current work.
Mujinga et al., (2019) proposed “Socio-technical Information Security Framework”. The framework has 
been designed while considered both technical and social aspects of information security. The authors claim 
that the development of security application can be improved by applying 12 design principles presented 
in the framework. The framework is more about providing a list of usable security design principles rather 
than contributing towards improving industrial processes.  
Parveen et al., (2014) presented a process-oriented approach for incorporating usability during the 
security system development lifecycle. In the proposed approach, all the requirements are assessed from 
which security requirements are extracted. For the security requirements threats, vulnerabilities are 
identified. The next phase involves the identification of usability requirements against a specific set of 
characteristics. Finally, security and usability analysis tests are performed to access the outcomes of 
requirement engineering process are highly secure and highly usable. The aspect which remains 
unaddressed is the practicality to adopt such a methodology in real industrial contexts such as identification 
of roles involved during the methodology. 
Hausawi and Allen (2014) presented an Assessment Framework for Usable Security (AFUS), which 
works by filtering and merging the security and usability requirements and then applying utility functions 
for risk analysis. The decision trees are generated to calculate the weight and utility of each characteristic 
of security and usability. The weights determine the relative importance of characteristics to be considered 
for the requirement specification of software. The authors claim that requirements specified after AFUS 
have a balance between usability, security and usable security.
Mairza and Zowghi (2010) presented an ontological framework for catering to the usable security 
conflict. The framework is based on the identification of usability/security requirements, identifying 
meaning and system context. After that, the conflicts are identified based on system requirements, 
characterized on the basis of their impact and listed. Then the nature of the identified conflict is determined, 
and the conflict resolution strategy is devised in line with the system requirements. 
Flechais et al., (2007) proposed “Appropriate and Effective Guidance for Information Security” 
(AEGIS). AEGIS presents a way of integrating usable security in the SDLC. It relies on involving the users 
and other stakeholders while designing the security features of the system. The major focus of the proposed 
approach is on involving the end-user while designing the system. This method has some limitations in a 
way that, the user at the requirement and design stage might not be able to perceive a clear picture of the 
system being developed. Users also have different aptitudes, involving a particular or a group of users does 
not mean that it incorporates the view of all users around the world. 
Moreover, from quality engineering perspective, Feitosa et al., (2015) investigated the trade-offs 
between sub-characteristics of a critical embedded system. Their investigation shows that the trade-offs are 
usually in favor of critical quality characteristics. However, the work is limited to identification of conflicts. 
Zhu et al., (2012) proposed a model of fuzzy soft goal interdependency graphs. The model uses qualitative 
and quantitative approaches to describe, analyze and evaluate the alternatives to certain quality 
characteristics (sometimes referred to as NFRsNon-Functional Requirements) and the relationships 

































































among them. It facilitates making trade-off decisions among the competing NFR alternatives. The tool can 
help in studying or at least documenting the conflicts. 
From the literature referred above, it is evident that different frameworks exist for aligning human 
aspects and security, but each one has its own limitations. Some of the limitations include, (1) no mechanism 
for identification of suitable trade-offs, (2) formulated to be applicable in specific contexts and scenarios, 
(3) challenges and limitations in applying the findings in a real context. Therefore, there is a need for a 
framework which aims at incorporating the human facet of security in the development of systems and 
service while also addressing the limitations in the existing work. 
3. Integrative Framework for Usable Security (IFUS)
A framework is an abstraction, underlying a system or a concept. The intent behind the creation of IFUS 
was to formulate means for facilitating system designers and developers in managing the conflicts. IFUS 
provides a mechanism for management of conflicts starting from identification of the conflicts to elicitation 
and documentation of the suitable trade-offs. The documented suitable trade-offs are disseminated among 
the designers and developers who are experts either in security or usability. It is expected to positively 
influence their decision-making abilities when it comes to the conflicts between security and usability in 
other but similar contexts. As stated earlier, the concerns raised after a series of interviews with security 
and usability practitioners working with our industrial partner were a key driving factor in development of 
the IFUS. It is pertinent to mention that the IFUS was created as a part of ‘co-creation’ project funded by a 
Finnish agency (Business Finland). The roles interviewed during the project included, (1) project manager, 
(2) lead architects, (3) security engineers, and (4) UX experts. Despite different viewpoints on importance 
of security and usability independently in their product lines, there was consensus among the interviewees 
on the following.
1. There are no practices and methods in place for integrating security and usability during the 
SDLC.
2. Alignment between security and usability has a direct business impact in terms of number of 
users using the product. 
3. Whenever, there are conflicts, informal meetings are conducted to address those conflicts. The 
outcomes of the meeting are considered as one-off event and are not documented.
4. In conflict situations where the security and usability professionals cannot reach an agreement, 
the trade-offs are in favor of security because no one is willing to take the risk, and that users 
should be able to use it as it is. 
5. The rule of thumb is, “if it is not possible to design it the easiest way, then try doing it the next 
easy way”.
These concerns are consistent with some of the existing industrial case studies, for instance, the one 
reported by Caputo et al., (2016). Moreover, in conjunction with the concerns raised after the interviews, 
we also referred to the limitations in the methodology (Naqvi and Seffah, 2018) identified after presentation 
at the conference. The research method used for development of the IFUS is design science research (DSR). 
IFUS could also be viewed as an evolved and extended version of the methodology (Naqvi and Seffah, 
2018).  This evolution is in line with the fundamentals of design science research, which supports iterative 
model of development. In this case feedback during the conference and industrial partner’s concerns formed 
a basis for planning and executing the iteration that led to creation of the IFUS. 
It is worthwhile to mention that IFUS presented in this paper was validated during a workshop involving 
the same practitioners who had participated in the interview stage. During the workshop, IFUS was exposed 
to comments and review by the participants, however other relevant issues discussed during the workshop 

































































do not fit within the scope of this paper. Concerning IFUS, the participants were of the view that IFUS 
provides a mechanism for communication between the security and usability practitioners, and 
documentation of the trade-offs as patterns would support dissemination of the solutions among the 
designers and developers working on different product lines and in other offices of the organization. 
Moreover, it was also noted that a catalog of patterns identified using IFUS could be helpful in training 
junior developers. Before describing IFUS, it is worthwhile to explain the process followed for its 
development.  
3.1 Process of creation
Design science is a paradigm involving the design and investigation of the artifacts in a particular context 
(Wieringa, 2014). The design science paradigm guides the design of artifacts and processes. The artifacts, 
in this case, are the design patterns; however, the process is the IFUS. The development process for the 
IFUS involved three cycles in line with the principles of design science research identified by Henver 
(2007). 
‒ The relevance cycle: The motivation behind this phase is to improve the environment by 
introducing new artifacts and processes to build these artifacts. The process is initiated considering 
a specific problem context nd the criteria for evaluation. Then there is a testing phase to assess the 
impact of the design artifact on the environment. The cycle iterates as much as it is required. In the 
context of this paper, the problem is the conflict between security and usability, the artifacts are the 
patterns, and the process is the IFUS. 
‒ The rigor cycle: This cycle includes selection, application, and evaluation of knowledge bases to 
build and evaluate artifacts. Knowledge bases include theories, experiences, experts and existing 
artifacts and processes. In this context, the knowledge base includes experience, existing case 
studies, existing frameworks, interviews of experts and feedback on the methodology (Naqvi and 
Seffah, 2018) during the conference.
‒ The design cycle: This is iterative and involves build and evaluate loop for artifact design both as 
product and as a process. The cycle iterates until the item is validated and new knowledge could be 
added to the knowledge base. The elements in the knowledge base as identified earlier were the 
key factors considered in planning and executing the iteration of this cycle which led to 
development of the IFUS. Moreover, it is important to note that the artifacts (patterns) were also 
validated by conducting a survey, however, due to patterns ability to evolve with time, a pattern 
after its creation and dissemination is continuously under review by the developers who use the 
pattern. The request for modification is considered and based on that, either existing patterns are 
evolved or new ones with different contexts are documented.
Moreover, the design science research method used for the creation of IFUS (process) and identification of 
patterns (artifacts) is presented in Figure.1.

































































Figure.1. Design Science Research Method (Adopted and re-drawn in particular context from (Henver, 2007))
The three cycles of the design science research process are presented in Figure.1. The arrows with the 
cycles are representing the iterative nature of the process. The environment is the software ecosystem, 
which includes systems and services with security and usability issues and the people involved in handling 
those issues. Moreover, in the design cycle, the IFUS was created and it contributed to the existing 
knowledge base with an addition of a process (IFUS) and artifacts (patterns identified using IFUS).
3.2 Integrative Framework for Usable Security (IFUS)
The IFUS has three layers, different elements and activities of the IFUS along with the participants is 
presented in Figure. 2. A bottom-up approach has been applied to construct the elements of IFUS. The 
participants during various activities in the IFUS are system designers and developers from security and 
usability domains. In line with the discussion in Section 2, the IFUS is adopted during the requirement-
engineering phase of the SDLC. The outcomes of employing the IFUS are documented as usable security 
design patterns, which are disseminated among the community of developers for use in other but similar 
contexts.

































































Figure. 2. Integrative Framework for Usable Security (IFUS)
It is worth mentioning here that IFUS does not automate the process but governs the activities to be 
performed at the requirements and design stage of the system development lifecycle. The key activities of 
the IFUS are grouped in five distinct phases which are, analyze, identify, resolve, disseminate and use. 
Feedback on the methodology during the conference and concerns raised during the interviews were 
considered while arranging the activities in different phases primarily to, (1) group the activities of similar 
nature, (2) support the layered-architectural pattern for the IFUS. Analyze refers to the phase where the 
requirements are collected and analyzed. In the identify phase, the goals with respect to both security and 
usability are identified leading to the identification of potential conflicts. In the resolve phase, the identified 
conflicts are resolved, which are documented as patterns to be disseminated in the disseminate phase. 
However, in the use phase, the developers use the patterns in other similar contexts.
The details of each activity during the five phases of IFUS are as follows.
‒ Access Software Requirement Specification Document: To initiate the process, security and 
usability experts access the Software Requirement Specification (SRS) to enumerate security 
requirements. Different knowledge sources can be used to initiate pattern writing including 
individual experiences, standards and best practices, specifications, and documents (Riaz et al., 
2016). IFUS uses the SRS document for the said purpose. 
‒ Enumerate the security features and focus areas: The security and usability experts access the 
SRS document to identify the security requirements of the system. This is done to ensure a specific 
focus on requirements directly affecting security and its usability.

































































‒ Elicit the security concerns: For the enumerated features, a specification of what is required from 
the security point of view is explicitly identified. IFUS works at the granular level, which involves 
identification of affected sub-characteristics of security (including confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, among others). While eliciting the concerns, it is important to consider both internal 
and external threats. 
‒ Determine the usability issues in conflict with security concerns: Once the security concerns 
are known, the requirement associated with each of the security concerns is subjected to usability 
analysis to identify instances of potential conflicts. A matrix of sub-characteristics of security 
(rows) and sub- characteristics of usability (columns) are created (see Figure. 3). Each element of 







Figure. 3. Matrix for describing a potential conflict between at sub-characteristic level
The sub-characteristics of security and usability are presented for exemplary purposes; other 
characteristics can be added to the matrix based on requirements.
‒ Prioritize the features: To prioritize the requirements in order of severity in terms of usable 
security consequences, a five-scale schema is presented.  The schema for prioritizing the 
requirements is inspired by the scale suggested by Nielsen and Norman (NN) Group 1.  Severity of 
usable security problem will be determined based on following factors.
1. Frequency of occurrence of a particular usable security problem
2. Possible Impact that a usable security problem has, if it occurs.
3. Persistence of usable security problem among the stakeholders and potential users, either 
it is identified once or repeatedly. 
The software requirements analyst is the role associated with this task, who is the one looking after 
the prioritization task based on the input from security and usability experts. Various system 
stakeholders including potential end users are involved during this stage to assign values for each 
of these factors. These factors are combined into a single rating (1-5) to facilitate prioritization and 
decision making.  It is relevant to mention that all these factors have equal weight in determining 
which scale is to be assigned. Using this criterion, values from 1-5 are assigned to each requirement 
based on the combined weight of all factors. Further information about the prioritization scale is 
presented in Naqvi and Seffah (2018). 
‒ Elicit the trade-off: Once the prioritized requirements along with security and usability concerns 
are known, the trade-offs are elicited explicitly while ensuring that both security and usability 
concerns have been catered with minimum possible compromise to any of these characteristics and 
their respective sub-characteristics. The main objective served during this activity is that it provides 
an avenue for integrating security and usability concerns, rather than developing a security centric 
1 https://www.nngroup.com/articles/how-to-rate-the-severity-of-usability-problems/
Place an “X” in the 
cell where there is 
a potential conflict

































































system, where the trade-offs are always favoring security. For eliciting the trade-offs, the security 
and usability experts consider the goals from security and usability perspectives concerning the 
requirement under consideration, and the standards and best practices concerning security and 
usability. Once goals from security and usability perspective are known, standards and best 
practices are accessed to tailor a solution causing minimal compromise to the involved 
characteristics. In case there is a trade-off, it is ensured that in the first instance no violation of the 
standards and best practices takes place. After this, a risk-based decision process is applied to 
determine the most optimal solution. In line with the risk-based decision process, the list of possible 
solutions (trade-offs) is identified, validated and accepted for documentation as patterns (Risktec, 
2005). Even after documentation of the suitable trade-offs as pattern, it is subjected to continuous 
monitoring and improvement by incorporating the feedback from the developers who apply these 
patterns. This is in line with pattern ability to be evolve and improve with time.  This activity is 
repeated for all security requirements in order of their priority.
‒ Document trade-offs as patterns: Once the suitable trade-offs have been identified, an effective 
approach is to document these as patterns. The patterns can be disseminated among the community 
of developers and designers to assist their decision-making abilities when it comes to the conflicts 
in other but similar contexts. The implementations based on the same patterns can differ, however, 
in such cases the suitable trade-off presented in the pattern serves as a starting point to build upon, 
rather than re-inventing the wheel and spending hours of effort on something which has already 
been done, but not known. A patterns’ template to document usable security patterns is presented 
in Figure. 4. 
Figure. 4. Template to document usable security patterns
‒ Disseminate: Whenever a new pattern is documented, it is added to the catalog. The catalog can 
be disseminated among the community of security developers via online pages, pocketbooks for 
developers, and release of white papers reflecting updates and newest patterns. 
‒ Use: This layer forms the topmost layer and the usage level of IFUS, where the common developers 
use usable security patterns to deliver usable and secure solutions.
Patterns have benefits like reusability, means of providing shared documentation, availability of 
common vocabulary, to mention a few (Riaz et al., 2012). It is imperative to mention here that one pattern 
 Title: The unique name of name for the pattern. Pattern can be named on basis of the problem it is solving or 
some names can be attributed to the solution suggested in the pattern.
 Classification: What is the category of the pattern, example categories can be authentication mechanisms, 
data protection, device protection. Classifying patterns and grouping them would assist developers to find 
them under the relevant category.  
 Prologue: One sentence that describes the intent behind this pattern.
 Problem statement: One or two sentences to summarize the problem addressed by the pattern.
 Context of Use: Patterns always have a particular context. A statement describing the context in which the 
particular patterns can be applied. The context should lack ambiguity so that the pattern is always applied in 
correct situations.
 Affected Sub Characteristics: The sub-characteristics of usability and security being affected/involved when 
this pattern is applied.
o Usability: 
o Security:
 Solution: One or two statements that guide on how to solve the problem.
 Discussion: Statements that illuminate the system of forces resolved (forces for us are the dimensions of 
conflicts) by the pattern.
 Type of service: Applicability of pattern from device/infrastructure perspective, e.g. mobile, desktop, web.
 Epilogue: One sentence per pattern that can be expected to follow this one or simply consequence of applying 
the pattern.













 that can also be applicable whenever the problem (being addressed in this pattern) occurs.

































































solves only one problem, therefore, a catalog of patterns can be built by applying the proposed framework 
to cover other aspects and to deliver usable and secure solutions. 
4. Instantiating the IFUS
The past decade has experienced enormous technological and social advancements; however, the power 
grid industry has arguably not revolutionized to keep pace with advancements in other sectors (Wang and 
Lu, 2013). With the idea of cyber-physical systems (CPS), researchers have begun to work on 
revolutionizing the existing infrastructure into next-generation power systems referred to as Smart Grids. 
Smart Grid involves the integration of computing and communication technologies with the existing 
infrastructure to enhance efficiency, reliability, etc. Due to safety concerns associated with specific services 
like advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), it is pertinent to consider the cybersecurity aspect as well. 
Furthermore, when security is considered, it should not be limited to discussing the network vulnerabilities, 
attack vectors, countermeasures against attacks, but it is imperative to consider the human facet of these 
security services as well. It is relevant to state that to the authors’ best knowledge no similar work (on 
usable security) before ours exists related to CPS in general and smart grids in particular. 
For this case study, a use case related to Smart Grids is considered. For the identification of relevant use 
cases, ‘Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security NISTIR 7628 Revision 1’ were assessed (NISTIR 7628, 
2014). The document identifies different categories and scenarios relevant to the security and privacy of 
users and the infrastructure in Smart Grids. Since the focus of this research is on usable security, therefore, 
a use case involving interaction with the customers (‘meter sends information’ within the AMI category) 
was selected. The use case identifies confidentiality and integrity as objectives from a security point of 
view. However, the case study is detailed considering a scenario where a customer tries to access the AMI 
from a trusted device to check current months’ meter reading of their house. To do so, the customer has to 
login to the system to get access. This scenario is discussed from the perspective of the IFUS activities 
below.
‒ Access Software Requirement Specification Document: In line with the activities of the IFUS, 
the first step is to access the SRS document, however, for illustration of the approach during the 
case study, NISTIR 7628 was accessed.  For the scenario just described, the use case is considered 
when a customer accesses the AMI to get information about the meter reading data. 
‒ Enumerate the security features and focus areas: The security-related features for the considered 
scenario are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Enumerated Security Features for the Scenario
Enumerated security features and focus areas
─ The AMI service must be available to the customer when accessed from home area network 
(trusted location).
─ The dialogue between AMI and customer home must be encrypted so that there is no 
unauthorized disclosure.
─ The meter reading data displayed to the customer must be the same as maintained in the 
records.
─ The customer must authenticate to AMI to access the information.
‒ Elicit the security concerns: It is important to identify the sub-characteristics of security 
associated with the identified security features and requirements (in Table 1). For instance, for the 
feature/requirement, “the customer must authenticate to the AMI to access the information”, 
essential aspects relevant to security such as goal, tasks are presented in Table 2. 

































































Table 2. Security Concerns for the considered requirement
Requirement Security Goal Security Tasks/Sub Tasks
The customer must 
authenticate to the AMI to 
access the information (meter 
record)
Authentication ○ Uniquely identify and authenticate users before allowing access to the 
system. 
○ Allow access to the system only after 
the user has passed the authentication 
stage.
○ Explicitly specify and document the 
authorization to user without 
authentication. 
○ Limit the number of parallel sessions 
for a particular user account
○ Prevent access to the system by 
locking the system after certain 
defined period of inactivity, or wrong 
authentication attempts.  
The details of security tasks to achieve the authentication goal have considered the same way as 
identified by Riaz et al., (2016). 
‒ Determine the usability issues in conflict with security concerns: This stage involves 
determining the usability issues arising with implementation of a specific feature and requirement. 
This activity is to be repeated for all security features identified during the first activity and for all 
system security tasks/sub-tasks identified during the second activity. For example, from the 
perspective of the case study being considered, as a consequence of the security task “prevent 
access to the system by locking the system after a certain defined period of inactivity, or wrong 
authentication attempts”, a user may find that the account was locked when s/he is back after 
responding to the doorbell or switching off the stove in kitchen. In this case, the user has to login 
again. From a security perspective, this is in line with the practices and recommendations. 
However, from the usability perspective, such implementations add to the cognitive load as for the 
user going through the security procedures takes longer than the task itself, which is to record meter 
reading. During system security development, the cognitive burden on the user end is given less 
priority compared to CIA goals of security leading to cases where the users evade the security 
procedures or give up on using a service rather than suffering from security (Glass et al., 2016).  








Figure. 5. Matrix for describing a potential conflict between authentication and satisfaction
The matrix presents conflicts between authentication (security) and efficiency (usability), and 
between authentication (security) and satisfaction (usability). 
Another instance of the conflict arises with the security task “uniquely identify and authenticate 
users before allowing access to the system”. Such tasks leave room for developers and security 
engineers to make authentication implementations as robust as possible. In such a case, a system 

































































might be implemented in which authentication with password requires “the password must be: at 
least 16 characters; has not been used in last 5 passwords; should not be a common dictionary word; 
should not be your name/surname; contains at least three of the fours character groups: English 
uppercase letters (A-Z), English lowercase letters (a-z), Special characters (@, $, #), Numerals (0-
9)”. This is all right from the security perspective, but these requirements add the cognitive load on 
users’ mind and have an impact on effectiveness in use and satisfaction. The potential conflicts 









Figure. 6. Matrix for describing a potential conflict between authentication and effectiveness, satisfaction
After following the activities just described, the requirements are prioritized using the prioritization 
scale discussed in the previous section. The output is sorted requirements in order of their priority.
‒ Elicit the trade-off: For the conflicts identified in the previous stage, the standards and best 
practices concerning security and usability are accessed to elicit the trade-off and document a 
solution that maximizes both characteristics. For the example under consideration, i.e. when a 
customer logs in to the AMI service to check the meter reading, and due to some unavoidable event, 
there is a premature automated logout due to inactivity, the customer is made to login to the service. 
Such events increase customers’ disengagement with the service and have an impact on usability 
elements like satisfaction and efficiency. Therefore, to elicit the trade-off a solution “whenever 
there is a premature timeout, the service should notify the customer about the requisite detail using 
a popup on the screen or a via text message or email” was identified, which can improve the 
usability and user’s experience without any impact on security. The risk-based decision process 
was considered during the case study while identifying a suitable trade-off (solution). In line with 
the design science process and as part of monitoring and improvement, the pattern was subjected 
to a validation study involving the developers, who encounter similar situations. Once a trade-off 
has been elicited it is documented as a pattern for developers to use.
‒ Document trade-offs as patterns: For the example just discussed, the trade-off was documented 
as a usable security pattern called “usable secure record inquiry pattern” and presented in Figure.7. 
Each developed pattern is added to the catalog and made accessible to common developers (through 
online pages, pocketbooks, and whitepapers) for use. 

































































Figure. 7. Usable Secure Record Inquiry Pattern
5. Validation Study
In line with the principles of design science research, the artifacts are created and validated (Wieringa, 
2014).  The artifacts, in this case, are the patterns created using IFUS. A validation study was conducted to 
validate the patterns’ template and the usable secure record inquiry pattern. The methodology for the study 
was adopted from Arteaga et al., (2009). The details of participants as specified during the study are 
presented in Table 3. The participants were recruited during a developer’s workshop held at the 
Lappeenranta University of Technology, and participation in the study was voluntary. The respondent’s 
consent was gathered before the study, and personal information (if any) shared during the study will not 
be disclosed at any stage. The results of the study were made available on request. To validate the patterns, 
the survey instrument was used to record the data from the participants. More details about the study are as 
below:
‒ Stages and Apparatus: The study was conducted in two stages. Stage-I involved responses from 
the participants on the usable security patterns’ template. However, Stage-II involved the validation 
of the Usable Secure Record Inquiry Pattern. In addition to the two stages, the study included 
briefing the participants about the aims and objectives of the study, the usable security problem, 
etc. The data was recorded on a questionnaire using a Likert scale (a scale of five - ‘Strongly Agree’ 
to ‘Strongly Disagree’). Feedback on characteristics such as understandability, completeness, 
genericity of the patterns’ template was desired during the Stage-I. However, during the Stage-II 
in addition to the feedback on characteristics just mentioned, for the pattern under consideration, it 
was intended to have a response on problem-solving ability, comprehension, among others.
• Title: Usable Secure Record Inquiry 
• Classification: Authentication mechanism, device protection
• Prologue: To increase customer satisfaction while using AMI or related services
• Problem statement: While using AMI service, the customer due to certain period of 
inactivity on the service might find the account as locked to ensure security of the service.
• Context of Use: Whenever there is a premature and automated logout from the system 
with the user unable to perform the main task, and with login the customer finds that the 
security procedures take longer than the task itself.
• Affected Sub-characteristics: The sub-characteristics of usability and security being 
affected/involved when this pattern is applied.
o Usability: satisfaction, efficiency 
o Security: authentication, confidentiality
• Solution: The customer should be notified of details about the record using a popup on 
the screen or via email or text messages, so that s/he does not have to login from to system.
• Discussion: In this case, premature log out due to inactivity would have caused a negative 
impact on the user experience (satisfaction, desirability). So rather than doing so, this pattern 
suggests to transmit the requisite information so that the user does not need to login again, 
thus balancing between security and usability, thereby increasing both of them.
• Type of service: CPS, smart grids, AMI
• Epilogue: Increased user satisfaction with no impact on security or in other words a usable 
secure authentication process.
• Related Patterns: Can be added later from the catalogue

































































Table 3. Details of Participants in the Validation Study
‒ Training Materials: The participants were provided with a document including the following: the 
objectives of the study, set of activities to follow during the study, background information 
concerning the patterns and usable security, and the problem scenario (for Stage II).
‒ Tasks: After the initial briefing, the participants were asked to fill the Study Questionnaire-I, 
followed by a briefing on the problem statement and what was intended in Stage II. After the 
briefing and the question-answer session, the participants were provided the Study Questionnaire 
II for their responses.
‒ Survey Questionnaire and Results: Two sets of questionnaires were designed, one for each stage. 
As mentioned earlier, during Stage-I it was desired to have a response on certain qualitative 
characteristics relevant to patterns’ template. The question statements included in the questionnaire 
for Stage-I are presented in Figure.8. 
Expert Background Company Type Experience 
(Number of Years)
1 Software Developer Software Services 2+
2 Software Developer Software Services 1
3 Software Developer Startup 7
4 IT Analyst Telecom 1+
5 Software Developer Design and Development 2
6 Software Developer Software Development 2.5
7 Technical Consultant Business Intelligence 2.5
8 Software Developer Software Development 4
9 Software Developer Software Solution Startup 3
10 Software Developer Information Technology 6
11 IT Analyst Information Technology 6
12 Software Developer Banking Services 7
13 UI/UX Expert Computer Software Company 8
14 Software Quality Engineer Software Development 9
15 Information Security Manager Information Technology 5

































































Figure.8. Study Questionnaire-I to record responses on patterns’ template
The tendency of participant’s opinion to Study Questionnaire-I is presented in Figure.9. Most of 
the participants found the patterns’ template understandable. Similarly, the tendency of responses 
to questions of completeness, genericity, means of providing a common vocabulary, usefulness 
respectively is presented in Figure.9.














Figure.9. Tendency of the participant’s opinion to Study Questionnaire-I
TASK
Please examine the pattern template before answering the questions. The items in the bullets 
are elements of the patterns e.g. title, classification, etc. followed by the details of what each 
item refers to. 
Question 1- Understandability
The basic intent behind patterns is to assist developers in solving common design problems. 
For this purpose, the patterns has to be understandable so that it is not used in a wrong way. 
Did you find the terms used in the pattern template understandable?
Question 2- Completeness
The template should be detailed enough to let the developer understand the problem, 
solution, consequences, context of use etc. Did you find the terms used in the pattern 
template complete?
Question 3- Genericity
Did you find the pattern template generic to be applicable in varying contexts of use and 
cover different problems in the domain?
Question 4- Providing Common Vocabulary
One advantage of patterns is to provide developers with shared documentation and common 
vocabulary. Did you find the terms used in the pattern template effective in this regard?
Question 5- Usefulness 
Considering specific case of usable security which require expertise in two different field 
i.e. usability and security, which are hard to find in one person. Do you consider the patterns 
template useful in a way to assist security developers assess the usability of their security 
option?

































































Furthermore, to have responses on the Usable Security Record Inquiry pattern, the Study 
Questionnaire II (Figure.10) was developed. 
Figure.10. Study Questionnaire-II to record responses on Usable Secure Record Inquiry
In response to the Study Questionnaire-II, the tendency of participant’s opinions is presented in 
Figure.11. Most respondents believed that multiple implementations could be derived from the 
solution presented in the Usable Secure Record Inquiry pattern. Furthermore, 12 out of 15 
participants ‘Strongly Agreed’ for the problem statement being enough to let the developers 
understand the user problem. The similar trend prevailed in terms of clarity of context of use as the 
`context of use has a crucial role to ensure that patterns are applied in the right scenarios. However, 
11 out of 15 participants ‘Strongly Agreed’ that the patterns managed the trade-off effectively, two 
participants ‘agreed’, whereas the other two participants were unable to assess. 
TASK
This is the second part of the survey, which is being conducted to validate ‘Usable Secure 
Record Inquiry’ pattern. Consider the scenario and the user problem you have been briefed 
about in the briefing session while answering the questions. 
Question 1
Each pattern describes a problem that occurs over and over again in our environment, and then 
describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this solution 
a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice. Do you think this holds true for 
the pattern under consideration?
Question 2
Patterns describe the thing “what” of the problem and process “how” to solve it. Was this 
criteria respected in the pattern under consideration?
Question 3
Did you find the problem statement detailed enough to let the developer understand the user’s 
problem?
Question 4
Did you find the context of use clear enough to let the developer apply the pattern in correct 
context?
Question 5
Do think the solution and discussion would enable the security experts to assess the usability 
of their security options? 
Question 6
Do you think the solution (by the pattern) manages a suitable trade-off between usability and 
security, without compromising anyone of them?
Question 7
Please respond as per your opinion, do the following characteristics are catered in the pattern 
under consideration?
I. Understandability 
II. Consistency in documentation/template
III. Providing Common Vocabulary
IV. Completeness 
V. Usefulness































































































































Figure.11. Tendency of the participant’s opinion to Study Questionnaire-II
Furthermore, question 7 (I-V) desired response on the characteristics as mentioned during Stage-I 
of the study. The difference lies in the fact that during the Stage-I the response was recorded for 
the patterns’ template, whereas during Stage-II it was meant for Usable Secure Record Inquiry 
pattern.
6. Discussion
The IFUS provides a mechanism for identification of the security and usability conflicts right from the start 
of system development lifecycle. The gaps in state of the art identified after literature review were also 
considered during the rigor and design cycle of the DSR methodology. As stated earlier, the IFUS is an 
extension and evolved version of the methodology (Naqvi and Seffah, 2018). Though the fundamentals 
remain the same but the main limitations of the methodology which have been addressed in IFUS include , 
grouping of similar activities in line with the practices used in the industry, identification of various roles 
involved in different activities during various phases, incorporating the elements of risk-based decision 
making for identification and elicitation of the suitable trade-offs, and, identification of a mechanism for 
dissemination of the design patterns.  
It is pertinent to state that in line with the principles of the DSR method for development of new processes 
and artifacts, two aspects demonstration, and evaluation must be considered (Peffers et al., 2007). The 
evaluation was done during the workshop where a group of participants reviewed the IFUS, however, to 
demonstrate the IFUS we conducted a case study, which is presented in the Section 4. The results of the 
study were later validated by involving a group of developers. However, some of the strengths and 
limitations of the IFUS are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Strengths and limitations of proposed approach
Strengths
+       Provides a mean to integrate security and usability during the phases of the SDLC
+       Provides means for identification of conflicts and their resolution
+       Supports continuous evaluation and evolution of the artifacts (patterns) based on elements of risk-based approach 
+       Provides a communication mechanism for practitioners from independently evolved domains (security and usability) 
for integrating their concerns in the design process
+       Supports saving costs and efforts associated with re-work in case where conflicts are identified later during the SDLC
Limitations
- Does not consider use of metrics and measures for the identification of conflicts 
- Does not provide a severity scale of evaluate degree of the conflict
- No means for determining the degree of a trade-off, for example the units of usability which are being comprised for 
security and vice versa. 

































































Moreover, a comparison of the current work with some of the existing frameworks is presented in Table 
5. The criteria used for comparison between the works are as below.
‒ Are security and usability considered together in the proposed solutions?
‒ Does the proposed approach focus on assisting the developers in handling the security and usability 
conflicts?
‒ Does the proposed approach emphasize handling usable security during the early phases of system 
development?
‒ Does the proposed approach ensure the adequacy of the usability of security?
Table 5. Comparison of Research Works
IFUS provides an opportunity to handle security and usability concerns from the early phases of the 
SDLC. Moreover, the documentation of outcomes as patterns also supports the learning aspect thereby 
assisting the developers in assessing the usability of their security options in similar contexts of use. The 
adequacy of usability of security is ensured in the solution due to the knowledge and experience of usability 
experts involved during elicitation of the suitable trade-offs and ensuring compliance to the standards and 
best practices while eliciting the trade-offs. Therefore, within the scope of IFUS, the adequacy of usable 
security is ensured from qualitative perspective, however, as a future work there is room for integration of 
a methodology to ensure the usability of security from a quantitative perspective. Lack of quantitative 
assessment of the conflicts and trade-offs is one of the limitations of the IFUS. As part of future work, it is 
intended to add the quantitative aspect to identify, (1) the degree of conflict between security and usability 
in a particular context; this would require a set of metrics and measures to determine such a degree. Once 
the degree of conflict is known, it can also be considered as a factor in the prioritization of the requirements 
associated with potential conflicts. (2) metrics to measure and evaluate the trade-offs when a solution is 
identified after the risk-based decision process.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a novel framework (to align security and usability during SDLC) was presented. The exemplar 
discussed to instantiate the framework features the first effort for aligning security and usability in CPS and 
smart grids. The results of a study to validate the patterns’ template and the patterns are also presented. 
Referring to some of the previous work as well, we also justified the importance of handling usable security 
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Though a case study regarding CPS and smart grids was discussed, this framework holds good for all 
kinds of systems including information systems, cloud infrastructures. Since usable security requires two 
sets of expertise, that are generally difficult to have within a single individual, patterns can be seen as a 
bridge between the security and usability world, between requirement engineering and usability. 
Given the proliferation of data-intensive systems, mobile devices, sensors and embedded networks 
creating new forms of systems where security incidents are more and more trigged by humans, the proposed 
approach offers up a novel solution to overcome core issues surrounding the development of secure and 
usable systems. The approach concerning the development of security systems and services needs to evolve 
from “user is the problem” to “user must be part of security technology-based solution”.
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